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No matter whether they adhere to a left-wing or right-wing political ideology, the evolution of 
a radical activist group shares a common trajectory. As such, it is possible to explore the rise 
and fall of a far-left organisation like the Weathermen in order to better understand the 
development of the alt-right, and to devise strategies to combat extremism in a contemporary 
context. By examining the role of identity politics in fermenting a radical socio-political 
agenda, as well as the tactics that contribute to the formation of a groupthink mentality, it is 
made clear that the very strategies of indoctrination and direct action that solidify a radical base 








No matter whether it exists on the far-right or extreme left of the political spectrum, the rise of 
a new social movement never occurs in a vacuum. Most are driven by the inherent need of a 
politicised citizenry to address a perceived injustice or inequality in society; others still may 
evolve as a response to rapid social change, and the apparent need to take action in order to 
preserve the existing status quo of social norms (Della Porta & Diani, 2009). Respectively, 
these central motivations have been responsible for the development of some of the most 
influential social movements of the last half-century: the countercultural left-wing activism of 
the 1960s and 1970s, and the more recent alt-right movement of the early 21st Century. While 
these movements are fuelled by socio-political views that exist at extreme ends of the 
ideological spectrum, there are nevertheless clear commonalities which reflect their shared 
construction as channels for participation in public affairs. A feature of most large-scale group 
actions is that levels of participation in a social movement varies widely between individuals 
(Verba & Nie, 1987). Just as there are members of the movement who show support in 
relatively passive ways, there are always participants in social movements that contribute in a 
more extreme and proactive manner; these committed activists play a central role in the 
formation of group identity by engaging in highly-visible actions, aiding in shaping wider 
public perceptions of the movement and attracting support for its stated cause celebre.  
 
In many cases, it is the actions of the most committed vanguard of a social movement that has 
the most impact in its success or failure. An exploration of the rise and fall of highly-visible 
radical organisations like Weatherman highlights the ways in which the adoption of a militant 
approach in social movements can undermine its ability to achieve its objectives. Through a 
two-pronged approach that used identity politics to foster division between the left-wing 
activists whilst simultaneously labelling the bourgeois middle-class as collaborators with the 
capitalist establishment, the Weathermen effectively undercut their ability to attract new 
support for their mission and establish itself as a legitimate vehicle for socio-political change 
(Murphey, 2015). Lessons can be taken from the Weathermen’s dramatic rise and fall that can 
be applied to the ongoing establishment of the alt-right as a viable socio-political movement. 
Unlike the Weathermen, the alt-right has made significant ground in its infancy with the 
election of an American president that is sympathetic to its views, and has benefitted 
considerably from the support of committed alt-right figureheads and activists (Mead, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the similar group dynamics of the Weathermen and those of the alt-right provide 
an opportunity to use the failure of one to predict the viability of the other. If it is possible to 
determine the ways in which Weathermen failed to establish itself in the late 1960s, it may in 
turn be possible to identify potential weaknesses in the alt-right that would allow its opponents 
to undermine its effectiveness and appeal as a socio-political ideology. 
 
Literature review 
Developing out of the traditionalist study of social movements in the mid-1960s, Habermas 
(1981) asserts that the field of new social movements is primarily focused on the paradigmatic 
shift from movements focused on economic parity towards those seeking to address non-
tangible issues associated with human rights. New social movements and the rise of post-
industrial activism was a central factor in the Weathermen’s ability to assume a position of 
prominence in far-left politics in the late 1960s. John Patrick Diggins describes the radical 
American Left of the 1960s as ‘the New Left’, and distinguishes it clearly from the Marxist, 
labour-oriented ‘Old Left’ that preceded it. In outlining the history of the American Left, 
Diggins observes a unique feature in each phase of the evolution of left-wing politics in the 
United States: while each phase – including the New Left – engaged with traditional Marxist 
ideas, these concepts were predominantly used to support a movement already in motion that 
was inextricably driven by uniquely American concerns to do with race, gender and politics 
(Diggins, 1992). Diggins’ perspective is clearly observable in the evolution of the Weatherman 
organisation. Originally a faction of the wider student activist movement, Jacobs argues those 
that would become the nexus of Weatherman were only able to shape the narrative of political 
action as a result of a broader social shift away from collective action that was concerned with 
the promotion of a proletariat revolution (1997, p. 66). By their very nature, new social 
movements are a more divergent affair than conventional labour-based leftist politics: whilst 
most committed left-wing activists continued to express the same kind of inclusive personal 
views as were prevalent under the former economic-based paradigm, the majority of political 
action groups formed under this new model were focused on single-issues such as LGBT rights 
or racial equality (Kriesi, 1996).  
 
Unlike the case in the labour movement, issues-based social movements have been observed 
by Bagguley (1992) as being far more likely to develop in the middle-classes of society given 
their focus on existential concepts of equality instead of practical improvements in the well-
being of the lower classes. Offe (1985) claims that new social movements occur primarily in 
civil society rather than the political sphere, and as such are less concerned with directly 
challenging the state than previous types of social activism. Offe’s position is obviously 
problematic when it comes to groups like the Weathermen, who focused almost exclusively on 
challenging the authority of the state; aside from their confrontational characteristics, however, 
Weatherman meets the vast majority of criteria required to be classified a new social 
movement. Thus, whilst its militancy makes it an outlier and must be acknowledged as a 
distinguishing factor, the Weathermen should regardless be considered a new social movement 
that is reflective of the cultural shift in left-wing activism that was dominant in the late 1960s.  
 
While the theory of new social movements is concerned solely with left-wing activism, the 
tenets of identity politics have been associated with socio-political campaigns waged by both 
the far-left and radical right-wing groups. Identity politics refers to the belief that a person’s 
socio-political perspective is inherently shaped by their experiences as a member of a social 
group with which they personally identify (Parker, 2005). Schlesinger (1991) argues that, while 
seemingly focusing on addressing the issues faced by marginalised subpopulations, identity 
politics has the converse effect of increasing levels of division in society. Schlesinger critiqued 
the tendency of the left to engage in identity politics in the 1960s and 1970s, arguing that 
‘movements for civil rights should aim towards full acceptance and integration of marginalised 
groups into the mainstream, rather than… perpetuating that marginalisation through 
affirmations of difference’ (Chaudhary & Chaudhary, 2009, p. 112). Crenshaw asserts that the 
problems of identity politics go beyond the division it fosters between subpopulations: further, 
she suggests that ‘the problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend differences… 
but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences’ 
(Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1241). Just as shared ethnic background did not mean that the SNCC were 
united in all aspects of their experience and socio-political perspective, Crenshaw argues for a 
more intersectional approach that acknowledges that identity – whilst an important aspect in 
shaping an individual’s worldview – is not the sole determining factor when it comes to their 
personal political philosophy.  
 
Although the Weathermen advocated for a broad cross-section of socio-political causes ranging 
from civil rights to feminism, the organisation has been routinely accused of incorporating 
identity politics at the core of its mission statement. Identity politics has been attributed as a 
driving cause for the escalation of the Weathermen’s strategies of violent militancy: an 
organisation predominantly consisting of participants who were white, educated and middle-
class, it has been suggested that the extremist tactics of Weatherman ‘was motivated by a 
mixture of despair at the prospects for change and of guilt arising from members’ acute 
consciousness of their own white privilege’ (Hodgdon, 2008, p. 144). Despite the almost 
exclusively Caucasian make-up of the Weathermen, much of the identity politics that the group 
engaged in was centred on providing a vanguard for other oppressed, minority populations. In 
Prairie Fire, a 1974 political statement issued by a later incarnation of the Weather 
Underground, the organisation makes clear that ‘the development of guerrilla organisation and 
armed activity against the state is most advanced in the black community’ and that ‘the crises 
of the society provide the training grounds’ for effective resistance (Weather Underground, 
1987, p. 173). In Prairie Fire, the Weathermen identify American cities as the battleground of 
an urban warfare campaign, against using the language of contemporaneous insurgencies in 
Vietnam and Central America to characterise their own domestic struggle. From the initial 
formation of the Weatherman movement, identity politics played a significant role in guiding 
the group’s ideology, as well as the methods employed in their campaign against the imperialist 
United States government.  
 
In his history of America’s radical underground, Burrough (2015) provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the formation of the Weathermen and attempts to place it within the broader context 
of activist culture in the 1960s and 1970s. It is Burrough’s contention that, like most of the 
radical groups that were born in the 1960s, Weatherman was largely inspired by the ‘foco 
theory’ advanced by Debray (1967); in musing on the nature of a successful revolution, and 
informed by the experiences of Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, Debray promoted the belief 
that ‘small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus (in Spanish, foco) for popular 
discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection’ (Hang, 2013, p. 
65). Burrough, quoting former Weatherman leader Mark Rudd, notes that the Weathermen saw 
their mission as ‘a holy faith’ and believed that they were ‘the only white people prepared to 
engage in guerrilla warfare in the imperial homeland’ (2015, pp. 184-185). Reference to the 
United States as ‘the imperial homeland’ is central to the Weatherman ideology, formed as it 
was amid the anti-Vietnam War movement that galvanised leftist protest across the country. 
To the Weathermen, the Vietnam War was another example of an American oligarchy profiting 
from conflict in the Third World (Varon, 2004). Indeed, the Weathermen saw their own 
domestic campaign against the United States government as analogous with the struggle of the 
Vietnamese against American imperialism — after its leadership met with North Vietnamese 
officials in Cuba in 1969, the Weathermen explicitly drew on the experience of the Vietnamese 
insurgency to inform the creation of a ‘People’s War’ that drew on ‘the support and active 
involvement of the masses’ to achieve success (Varon, 2004, p. 137). As is to be expected 
given its relatively unique place in the history of domestic terrorism in the United States of 
America, most scholarly constructions of the Weathermen are preoccupied with the group’s 
focus on armed struggle; as such, gaps in the literature exist when it comes to a thorough 
analysis of Weatherman’s group dynamics and the ways in which its objectives were informed 
by the tenets of identity politics.  
 
Given its far more recent introduction into the socio-political discourse, it is unsurprising that 
there is considerably less literature available that analyses the alt-right in comparison to that 
which exists in relation to the Weathermen. Lyons (2017a) describes the term ‘alt-right’ as 
referring to the ‘alternative right’, a community of politically conservative outliers identified 
by white supremacist ideologue Richard Spencer in 2008. It took the better part of a decade for 
the term to enter into mainstream political discourse: Hawley (2017) claims that the alt-right 
first rose to global prominence during the 2016 election, and refers to a right-wing movement 
that rejects establishment conservative in favour of an isolationist, white nationalist socio-
political philosophy. Indeed, white nationalism has increasingly played a role in the 
development of the alt-right as the movement has continued to establish itself as a political 
ideology. From an academic perspective, the alt-right draw a sense of legitimacy from the work 
of controversial scholars like evolutionary psychologist Kevin B. MacDonald, notorious for 
research on the Jewish community that have been roundly criticised as anti-Semitic 
(MacDonald, 1998). MacDonald’s views on Jewish collectivism – widely considered to 
endorse the concept of a Zionist conspiracy – were credited by political scientist Abraham 
Miller as ‘the philosophical and theoretical inspiration’ for much of the anti-Semitic slogans 
and signs seen at the 2017 Unite the Right rally (Miller, 2018). MacDonald’s influence on alt-
right ideology is noted by Hawley (2019), who notes the movement’s obsession with a 
philosophy dubbed ‘race realism’. The concept of ‘race realism’ builds on MacDonald’s belief 
that biological influences inherently motivate the behaviours of certain ethnic groups, and 
underpins an isolationist and anti-immigrant position adopted by members of the alt-right 
worldwide. It also underpins the work of Renaud Camus, who postulated that mass immigration 
would ultimately lead to a ‘great replacement’ in which Western culture would be gradually 
destroyed (Camus, 2011). Reference to the Great Replacement has taken on a mythic role in 
alt-right ideology, assuming a central role in a several manifestos released by perpetrators of 
mass shootings linked to the alt-right and its overarching principles.  
 
Just as the left-wing new social movements of the mid-20th Century focused on changing 
cultural values rather than affecting political change directly, Nagle observes that the alt-right 
‘will continue to infiltrate mainstream US formal politics through culture’ in an attempt to 
cultivate a groundswell of grassroots support that would essentially normalise its presence in 
the mainstream political discourse (2017, p. 52). It is widely considered that the election of 
Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States of America is reflective of this 
normalisation of the alt-right to a certain extent, due to the perception that there is a significant 
level of cross-over between alt-right ideology and the values of those who support Trump’s 
anti-establishment agenda (Barkun, 2017). As a result, ‘many Alt Rightists see themselves as 
the Trump coalition’s political vanguard, taking hardline positions that pull Trump further to 
the right while enabling to look moderate by comparison’ (Lyons, 2017b, p. 16); the concept 
of vanguardism was also central to the modus operandi of the Weathermen, furthering the 
argument that the alt-right serves a similar role in modern conservative politics that their radical 
counterparts played in the left-wing movements of previous generations. Phillip W. Gray 
(2018) supports this position, describing the alt-right as ‘overlapping’ with American left-wing 
politics in several ways. He argues that ‘rather than a quirk of the 2016 electoral cycle’ the alt-
right will build on the foundations of nationalism and identity politics that it is has already 
established to ‘increase in its importance as a “rightist” form of intersectionality’ that has a 
persistent role in American political discourse into the future (Gray, 2018, p. 141).  
 
Identity politics and ideological schism: the rise of the Weatherman 
For both the Weathermen and the alt-right, it was an enthusiastic adoption of identity politics 
that would create the ideological schisms that would precipitate their formation. A desire to 
advocate for an oppressed population is central to the existence of activist groups that trade in 
identity politics. The transition from a traditional broad-coalition model of activism to a more 
clearly directed identity-oriented paradigm can be seen in the birth of the Weatherman 
movement at the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) National Convention held in 
Chicago in June 1969 (Burrough, 2015). An evolution of the long-standing socialist 
organisation the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) established in 1960, SDS 
sought from the outset to expand its scope from the traditional labour-focused platform of its 
predecessor organisation; the Port Huron statement, released in 1962 and serving as SDS’s 
ideological manifesto, called for ‘the establishment of a democracy of individual 
participation… [wherein] the individual share[s] in the social decisions determining the quality 
and direction of his life’ (Miller, 1994, p. 14). While undoubtedly more broadly focused on 
achieving equality for oppressed populations in American society, the values underpinning the 
Port Huron statement nevertheless remained a clear reflection of the Marxist ideology that was 
typical of its previous incarnation as the SLID.  
 
SDS’s national convention in Chicago in June 1969 marked a turning point for the organisation 
that would see these core values held to ransom by a hard-line faction dedicated to identity 
politics, which would eventually become known as ‘Weathermen’ and, later, the Weather 
Underground. By the 1969 conference, a considerable faction had developed within SDS who 
were convinced that the organisation should be focused on combating American imperialism 
and institutional racism, rather than continuing to make appeals to the proletariat using the tired 
socialist mantra of class struggle (Sale, 1973). This faction, calling itself Revolutionary Youth 
Movement (RYM), exerted more influence over SDS than the traditionalist Progressive Labor 
faction by 1969, and used its power over the organisation to force a split in SDS over the issue 
of the organisation’s support for black nationalism (Burrough, 2015). RYM leader Bernardine 
Dohrn announced on the conference’s third day that her faction could no longer collaborate 
with Progressive Labor based on a singular ideological difference: their reluctance to become 
further involved in black nationalism based on their fundamental belief that it was a ‘diversion 
from the all-important class struggle’ (Barber, 2010, p. 12).  
 
Using their strength of numbers RYM was able to have Progressive Labor expelled from SDS, 
effectively taking control of the group and ‘re-branding’ itself as a more radical revolutionary 
front called ‘Weatherman’ (Burrough, 2015). It is clear that identity politics were at the 
forefront of the schism in SDS, and were the primary reason that the Weatherman faction was 
able to negotiate its way into a position of ideological power in the left-wing activist 
community. Had it not been for the basic concepts of identity politics entering into the 
mainstream of socio-political discourse, it is likely Progressive Labor would have had far more 
support for its tried-and-tested socialist philosophy. Identity politics was not a creation of 
RYM, yet this faction were able to capitalise on the growing appeal of New Left ideology to 
obtain the support required within SDS to take control and use the organisation as a platform 
for a more radical agenda. 
 
‘Aggrieved whiteness’ and the identity politics of the alt-right 
It is somewhat ironic to consider that the issue of black nationalism played such a significant 
role in re-shaping the construction of SDS when so few members of the university-based 
organisation were from an African American background. Though ardent supporters of militant 
African American groups like the Black Panthers and the Black Liberation Army, the 
leadership group of the Weathermen were mostly university-educated, came from upper-
middle class backgrounds and, importantly, were exclusively white (Vertigans, 2011). Whereas 
the Weathermen acted from a position of white privilege to campaign primarily for a 
marginalised African American population, the alt-right has taken a more purist approach to 
identity politics in the sense that it is a movement built predominantly on a sense of what 
Thompson and Thurston (2018) describe as ‘aggrieved whiteness’. Under this paradigm of 
‘aggrieved whiteness’ it is the white American that is perceived to be oppressed, threatened 
economically and morally by the influences of liberal values on issues from national security 
and immigration to feminism and globalism. Buchanan, credited with contributing to the rise 
of the alt-right with his book Death of the West (2001), acknowledges that it is the expansion 
of conservative focus that is most appealing about this new social movement. He claims that 
the appeal of the alt-right derives from ‘the idea of economic nationalism, an end to globalism, 
putting America first in trade, securing our border, one nation, one people… this is a new and 
enlarged agenda’ (Nagle, 2017, pp. 56-57). Buchanan’s explanation of the alt-right’s appeal 
correlates clearly with the concept of new social movements that defined left-wing politics in 
the 1960s. Rather than focused on affecting political change directly on individual issues, the 
alt-right provides a holistic worldview that its adherents can ascribe to; this overarching socio-
political ideology is firmly based on the premise of an individual’s identification as an 
‘aggrieved white person’, once more reviving the identity politics that was so influential in 
previous generations. 
 
A key distinction between the Weathermen and the alt-right derives from the varying levels of 
formality in each movement’s management and leadership. While never seeking to become a 
legitimate political force, Weatherman’s origins as a faction of SDS were highlighted by the 
adoption of a formal command structure that is non-existent in the alt-right. Perhaps the most 
applicable equivalent to SDS in the alt-right’s origin narrative is the Tea Party movement which 
in many ways served as a spiritual predecessor sharing many of the same anti-establishment 
values espoused by members of the alt-right. In contrast to SDS, however, the Tea Party 
movement has never been officialised in the sense that it has a clear leadership structure: 
instead, the Tea Party is led by charismatic political figures expressing anti-establishment 
sentiments promoting the virtues of limited government and deficit reduction (Zernike, 2010). 
As was the case with Progressive Labor and its class-oriented focus, the Tea Party movement 
is limited in scope to the extent that it could not be considered a fully-realised ‘worldview’ in 
the same sense that the alt-right could be; that said, its role as a soft-version of radical 
conservatism is analogous to that played by SDS in that it served as a precursor to radicalism 
albeit with an efficacy and appeal that is challenged by the influence of identity politics (Stein, 
2016). Racialised constructions like that of ‘aggrieved whiteness’ go beyond identifying the 
problem with American society in the way that the Tea Party did. Instead, the alt-right is able 
to use these social constructions to diagnose the root causes of social problems, and provide 
solutions for these causes that are aligned with the holistic global perspective it has created.  
 
Groupthink and self-criticism in building radical collectives 
While the cultivation of influence is an important aspect for social movements attempting to 
control the ideological narrative, it is less important than the process of radicalisation that 
occurs when indoctrinating core members of the group. After the split in SDS and the RYM’s 
re-branding into the Weathermen, the organisation’s leadership group determined that it would 
be necessary to engage in purposeful strategies designed to weaken existing connections 
between members and their families; it was the belief of the Weathermen that loosening these 
bonds and breaking down personal barriers would ‘toughen up’ the group’s mostly white, 
intellectual volunteers and transform them into an ‘urban fighting force’ (Burrough, 2015). To 
ensure that Weathermen recruits had made a commitment to the cause, they were also allocated 
to a ‘collective’ by the leadership; these collectives were positioned in locations around the 
United States of America, and essentially acted as self-contained cells for the Weathermen that 
operated with minimal oversight from the group’s central committee (Varon, 2004). Creating 
a disconnect between a radical organisations membership and the norms of society-at-large is 
a tactic typical in the foundation of terrorist organisations, and is particularly prevalent in 
groups whose objectives are unobtainable and engaging in violent action is widely perceived 
to be ‘self-defeating’ (Tsintsadze-Maass & Maass, 2014, p. 735). More than just fostering 
organisational unity, the separation process contributes to a sense of anomie in which an 
environment of normlessness allows the leaders of an organisation to reshape the worldview 
of its members in a way that would otherwise be considered extreme or deviant (Merton, 1968).  
 
In order to achieve this, the Weathermen required its members to do more than just cut ties 
with the lives they had before joining the movement: the Smash Monogamy policy developed 
in the latter half of 1969 required romantic couples to separate, even if both were members of 
the Weathermen and living together in the same collective (Burrough, 2015). A short-lived 
addendum to the Smash Monogamy policy was the directive that members of a collective 
participate in sexual orgies that would serve the dual purpose of severing romantic bonds with 
greater finality, as well as contributing to the development of a groupthink mentality in an 
individual Weathermen unit (Thoburn, 2008). It was the official position of the Weatherman 
leadership that ‘people who fuck together, fight together’, a policy typified by the ‘Wargasm’ 
orgies held prior to political actions in an attempt to motivate group members to participate 
with greater enthusiasm and commitment (Mewshaw, 1984, p. 45). Essentially, it was the goal 
of the Weathermen to construct an environment in which a member’s loyalty was exclusively 
to the group; this process of isolation inevitably creates an echo chamber in which an 
individual’s only contact is with those holding the same views as them, allowing them both to 
regularly confirm the veracity of their perspective and become increasingly extreme in lieu of 
exposure to dissenting socio-political positions. 
 
Whilst their anti-monogamy strategy created strain by purposefully dismantling personal 
relationships, the Weathermen’s program of criticism/self-criticism has been labelled as the 
aspect of collective conditioning that took the most significant toll on members. Criticism/self-
criticism, a strategy borrowed from Maoist China, was intended to foster a sense of emotional 
and psychological honesty, as well as further break down the barriers between members of the 
collective (Varon, 2004). These sessions, which often would stretch on for hours without pause, 
typically began with all members of a collective singling out one of their peers and outlining 
all of their perceived flaws; it would then fall on the individual to publically criticise their own 
thoughts and behaviours, in an environment described by Varon as ‘part political trial, part 
hazing, part shock therapy, part exorcism, and, in a word used by more than one member, part 
“brainwashing”’ (2004, p. 59). Bill Ayers, an early Weatherman leader, referred to 
criticism/self-criticism sessions as a case of members ‘tripping over one another to be exactly 
alike, following the sticky rules of congealed idealism’ (Ayers, 2001, pp. 160-1); another 
former Weatherman, David Gilbert, claimed that the sessions were ‘permeated by the dominant 
culture of competitive individualism… marred by efforts to pull people down in order to gain 
a higher rung in the hierarchy’ (Gilbert, 2012, p. 124). It appears that instead of being an 
emotional unburdening activity, the criticism/self-criticism program had the effect of 
streamlining the group mentality. By formalising the public criticism of others, members were 
socialised to adhere closely to the collective norms of the group in order to avoid scrutiny. Just 
as the formation of collectives contributed to the creation of an echo chamber, criticism/self-
criticism reiterated the importance of ideological unanimity within the Weathermen, and 
strengthened an individual’s connection to the revolutionary purpose of the organisation. 
 
Echo chambers of the alt-right in the online world 
Even though the alt-right do not tend to live in collective communities in the same way that 
their counterparts in the Weathermen did, this does not mean that they are not subject to similar 
kinds of echo chambers that serve to reinforce their ideological positions. For the alt-right, 
these echo chambers typically come in the form of online forums either dedicated to an ultra-
conservative worldview or otherwise co-opted by members of the alt-right community for these 
purposes (Malmgren, 2017). In a practical sense, it seems that the echo chambers established 
by the Weathermen and the alt-right differ considerably — while the Weathermen went to great 
lengths to isolate their members from support networks and sought to break down their 
resistance in a collective environment of co-ideologists, radicalised members of the alt-right 
experience a far softer, more passive approach wherein this process typically occurs in their 
own home via the medium of the internet. While not sharing the same apparent degree of 
intensity as the strategy used by the Weathermen – which had an immediate, tangible impact 
on participants – the tactics of isolation and radicalisation employed in the alt-right differ only 
by degree, rather than substance. Instead of forcing isolation as the Weathermen did, the alt-
right fundamentally takes advantage of a vulnerable population that is already self-isolated. 
Participants in alt-right forums and associated online activity often do so individually, as a 
means of finding a community that shares their own pre-existing views on issues like race, 
gender and politics (Nagle, 2017). Having already self-isolated, and in the process of actively 
using the internet to seek out similarly-minded individuals, the new alt-right member does not 
need to undergo the same type of deprogramming program that the Weathermen used in the 
1960s and 1970s. Already primed to participate in the movement, the new alt-right member 
undergoes a slower process of increasing involvement in online forums that, over time, results 
in the same outcome of total isolation within the echo chamber.  
 
To a certain extent, this version of the radical collective adopted by the alt-right is more 
pervasive and easier to access than those of the 1960s: if an individual has access to an internet 
connection, and the desire to do so, they are able to gain access to these online communities 
that exist with their own sets of social norms and values. Nagle argues that the accessibility of 
the online world has ‘undoubtedly allowed fringe ideas and movements to grow rapidly in 
influence’ (2017, p. 30). While it was necessary for the Weathermen to purposefully engage in 
re-conditioning of their members in order to construct a movement with its own set of internal 
norms and values, the alt-right has been able to create a fully formed subculture with internally 
consistent normative features without the same kind of intentional direction (Phillips & Milner, 
2017). Forums dedicated to alt-right values on the internet are not venues where divergent 
socio-political opinions are welcome and, in fact, those expressing views contrary to the 
normative philosophy of the group are usually removed from the community either by informal 
means like trolling, or formal bans issued by moderators (Owen et al, 2017). In doing so, online 
forums contribute to the normalisation process of alt-right views by creating an echo chamber 
where dissent is prohibited in a manner not unlike that created in the collectives established by 
the Weathermen. 
 
Members of alt-right forums hosted by popular websites like 4chan and Reddit have, to some 
degree, gone further than the Weathermen in constructing these echo chambers: more than 
superficially connecting over shared objectives and ideological perspectives, the online alt-
right even uses its own language conventions to communicate with each other and shape the 
way that participants interpret their own reality (Nagle, 2017). In creating its own lexicon, the 
alt-right works to preclude participation from those that are not familiar with the minutiae of 
their philosophy. Adherents of the alt-right are able to communicate with each other using 
terms that have been created as a shorthand for prejudicial or discriminatory rhetoric: popular 
terms like ‘femoid’ seek to dehumanise women, whereas words like ‘cuck’ draw on racialised 
connotations to insult those deemed by the alt-right to be weak or otherwise emasculated 
(Sonnad & Squirrell, 2017; Squirrell, 2017). The veritable dictionary of alt-right devised 
terminology works as more than just a way for members to show a sense of fraternity with each 
other; it also serves as a means of identifying interlopers in alt-right forums, allowing them to 
be targeted by ‘true believers’ (Malmgren, 2017).  
 
While in some cases these interlopers might be left-wing activists seeking to infiltrate their 
political opposition, it is more common than not that these individuals are soft-proponents of 
the philosophy attempting to engage with the wider alt-right community. In situations such as 
this, the targeted hazing of new members of the alt-right is decidedly reflective of the 
criticism/self-criticism program of the Weathermen: in order to gain entry and be considered a 
true member of the ideological vanguard, a member must undergo a process of group criticism 
wherein they are forced to acknowledge their shortcomings and defend their right to join the 
movement (Hartzell, 2018). Surviving the criticism/self-criticism process fosters a greater level 
of investment in the group, forcing members to conform to the canons of alt-right philosophy 
or find themselves excluded from the community (Owen et al, 2017). By making the decision 
to actively conform to the normative values established in these echo chambers, members of 
the alt-right undergo a process of radicalisation that effectively separates them from 
mainstream society on a philosophical level, if not a physical one.  
 
Disruption through direct action in the ‘Days of Rage’  
Fostering the creation of a subpopulation with its own internal norms and values is at the heart 
of the radicalisation process, and is an essential precursor to facilitating an organisation’s 
transition from intellectual activism to a rawer, more physical form of direct action (Tsintsadze-
Maass & Maass, 2014). Making the leap from non-violent protest to an overtly violent 
revolutionary activity is not an easy step for most organisations; as it was with the Weathermen 
in 1969, the adoption of a revolutionary strategy often results in a haemorrhaging of support 
from within the ranks of the non-radicalised that can prove fatal when it comes to the 
organisation’s influence and survival as a socio-political force (Tilly, 2003). The failure of the 
‘Days of Rage’ action held in Chicago from 8 October 1969 to 11 October 1969 has been 
widely attributed to the sudden shift to overtly violent tactics that was triggered by the RYM’s 
coup d’état at the SDS conference held several months earlier. It was at this event that the 
RYM leadership – who would go on to become the core ‘Weathermen’ – devised the strategy 
for the Days of Rage: drawing on the faction’s philosophical belief that ‘the elections don’t 
mean shit’ and rather ‘our power is in the street’, it was the intention for the Days of Rage to 
act as a large-scale demonstration in which members of the activist community would join the 
Weathermen in several days of street-fighting and, particularly, violent engagements with 
Chicago police (Burrough, 2015).  
 
Ultimately, the Days of Rage achieved little in terms of either tangible socio-political change 
or cultivating increased support for the Weathermen’s revolutionary approach to activism. To 
a considerable extent, it was the very concept that these demonstrations would serve as little 
more than public street-fights that began to dismantle the broad-based coalition cultivated by 
SDS over a period of years. Leaders of the cross-sectional National Mobilisation Committee 
dismissed the projected violent outcomes of the Days of Rage as ‘counterproductive’ and 
refused to participate (Burrough, 2015); similarly, many of the more mainstream members of 
SDS rejected its own resolution to hold the Days of Rage after the Weathermen faction used 
an explosive to blow up a statue of a police officer in Chicago’s Haymarket Square two days 
before the protests were due to commence (Jacobs, 1970). The bombing of Haymarket Square 
was intended as a symbolic strike against police in their role as ‘agents of the state’, yet was 
seen by moderate activists as further evidence that the Weathermen were rogue operators that 
were more intent on violent struggle against the state than they were in facilitating lasting socio-
political change. Even the group used as a predicate for the Weathermen’s takeover of SDS, 
the Black Panthers, were vehemently opposed to joining them in their Days of Rage. Chicago 
Panthers’ leader Fred Hampton argued heatedly with Weatherman leaders not to proceed with 
the Days of Rage, and went on to distance himself from the protest action describing the 
Weathermen as ‘anarchistic… Custeristic’ (Beattie, 2004, p. 93). Losing the support of 
Hampton and the Black Panthers was more than a loss in terms of participation in the Days of 
Rage: it fundamentally undercut the Weathermen’s philosophical stance espoused at the SDS 
conference several months earlier. In spite of having organised themselves around the 
principles of identity politics by asserting it was their primary focus to support the agenda of 
black nationalism, the Weathermen’s pressing desire to exert violence against the state 
overrode these organisation principles to the point that only the most hardened adherents of 
their movement were able to justify the Days of Rage in the broader context of the movement.  
 
In practice, the Days of Rage proved to be a failure for the Weathermen. Far from the thousands 
that had been expected to participate nationwide, only a small cell of roughly 350 protesters 
were willing to face down the more than 2000 Chicago police officers gathered on the evening 
of 8 October 1969 (Burrough, 2015). Rioters attempted to storm the Drake Hotel in downtown 
Chicago, but were unable to gain access after being stopped at a police blockade. Over four 
days of protest actions, the Weathermen injured several police officers and caused $35 000 in 
property damage; conversely, the Days of Rage resulted in 287 members of the Weathermen 
group being arrested, including most of the organisation’s leadership (Bingham, 2016, p. 131). 
The organisation was forced to regroup in the period after the Days of Rage. Part of this 
regrouping process involved a ‘war council’ held from 27 December 1969 until 31 December 
1969  in Flint, Michigan, intended to determine the group’s approach to radical activism going 
forward (Jacobs, 1997). It would be expected that, following the Black Panthers’ public 
rejection of the Days of Rage, that the Weathermen would have sought to revisit their core 
commitment to supporting the cause of black nationalism. 
 
If the Flint War Council showed anything, it was that the opposite was true and that the 
Weathermen were as committed to identity politics as ever before. The location of the meeting, 
a dance hall in the middle of a ‘black ghetto’, was specifically chosen for its symbolic value; 
dried blood stains from a shooting the night prior still remained in one corner of the room, a 
fact which Weatherman leader Mark Rudd claims made the room a ‘fitting place’ for the war 
council to be held (Rudd, 2009, pp. 185-93). Indeed, amongst the images of revolutionary 
leaders posted around the room as decoration, an entire section of the hall was covered in 
pictures of Fred Hampton, who had been killed by police in the months between the Days of 
Rage and the Flint War Council (Rudd, 2009). In yet another example of identity politics, the 
Weathermen sought to use Hampton’s death as a cause to rally around, and as further proof of 
the police’s brutal response to black activists; using Hampton to justify their revolutionary 
actions can only be perceived as an example of the Weathermen’s identity politics, particularly 
considering that Hampton had been an outspoken critic of the organisation and no friend to its 
leadership while alive. While the Days of Rage had failed to achieve the objectives the 
Weathermen had intended them to, it was the decision of the Flint War Council to dissolve 
SDS and continue the revolutionary struggle as a clandestine fugitive organisation dubbed ‘the 
Weather Underground’; instead of focusing on more mass mobilisations like the Days of Rage, 
the group would limit involvement and focus on the development of a smaller revolutionary 
vanguard that was committed to a violent struggle against the state (Varon, 2004).  
 
Charlottesville: Has the alt-right had its own Days of Rage? 
While the Weathermen fell short in when it came to their goal of using the Days of Rage to 
unify left-wing radical groups behind their agenda, the Unite the Right rally held in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 could be perceived to have achieved this objective on 
the opposite end of the socio-political spectrum. Unlike the way in which the Days of Rage 
grew out of a motion passed at the SDS conference in 1969, the Unite the Right rally was from 
its beginnings a collective action organised by a wide diaspora of alt-right groups from neo-
Nazi website The Daily Stormer to the National Policy Institute, and featured the involvement 
of organisations from the well-established Ku Klux Klan to the relatively more recent Fraternal 
Order of Alt-Knights (Peters & Besley, 2017). Though many of those participating in the 
Charlottesville event shared white nationalist views, the core factor binding this broad coalition 
together was an adherence to the ideological position of the alt-right, and the view that 
mainstream conservatism was no longer effective in defending true right-wing values 
(Atkinson, 2018). Nominally, the Unite the Right rally was held in protest of the removal of a 
Confederate statue by Charlottesville officials on the grounds of racial sensitivity in the wake 
of the racially motivated Charleston church shooting in mid-2015 (Atkinson, 2018); in reality, 
this cause was more of a representation of the broader grievances held by the alt-right, and a 
recognition of the centrality of racial identity as an organising principle in the movement.   
 
When it came to the use of violence in the Days of Rage, the Weathermen were clear about the 
fact that they intended to engage in physical confrontations with police and counter-protesters. 
Whilst organisers of Unite the Right argued that their event was only ever intended to be a civil 
protest, there is reason to believe that this was not the case and that – as in the Days of Rage – 
the provocation of a physical confrontation was a central objective of participants. On the first 
day of the protest, 11 August 2017, Unite the Right protesters marched towards the University 
of Virginia campus where a number of counter-protesters had gathered; as they marched, they 
chanted white nationalist slogans like ‘white lives matter’ and ‘you will not replace us’ 
(Stolberg & Rosenthal, 2017). Again, the specific use of these slogans highlights the fact that 
identity politics was perhaps even more central to the organisation of the alt-right coalition than 
it was to the Weathermen. Many of these marchers wore matching outfits comprising of khaki 
shorts and polo shirts, and carried tiki torches, in a further suggestion that a well-defined and 
purposeful group identity had been constructed around the alt-right by this point (Lopez, 2017). 
Members of this alt-right group encircled a small group of counter-protesters on 11 August, 
and a brawl ensued that was broken up by police; it appears that this confrontation was 
unprovoked, and was driven primarily by the Unite the Right marchers in a purposeful effort 
to engage in violence in a way not entirely dissimilar from the Weathermen in their Days of 
Rage (Lopez, 2017).  
 
Conflict between Unite the Right and counter-protesters increased exponentially the following 
day, as around 500 alt-right demonstrators clashed with more than one thousand anti-fascist 
opponents on the morning of 12 August 2017, causing the City of Charlottesville to declare a 
state of emergency in an attempt to disperse the rioting taking place on the streets (Stolberg & 
Rosenthal, 2017). The conflict culminated in the death of one anti-fascist protester, killed when 
an alt-right demonstrator aligned to the group Vanguard America drove his car into a group of 
counter-protesters (Bromwich & Blinder, 2017). Given this fatality, and the highly-public 
demonstrations of violence in Charlottesville, the rally attracted a considerable level of 
condemnation with even alt-right sympathisers like former Breitbart News chairman Steve 
Bannon declaring ethno-nationalist protesters to be ‘losers… a fringe element… a collection 
of clowns’ (Levin, 2017); the rejection of Bannon, considered a key figure in promoting the 
alt-right through its infancy, serves as a crushing blow to the movement not unlike the way in 
which Fred Hampton’s dismissal of the Weathermen fundamentally undermined its stated 
purpose to advance the cause of black nationalism. While the Unite the Right rally had the 
potential to terminally impact on the alt-right in the same way that the Days of Rage did for the 
Weathermen, a key distinction exists between the two events: whereas the Days of Rage 
attracted almost universal criticism, the Unite the Right movement was tacitly supported by 
United States President Donald Trump in several statements wherein he indicated that blame 
for the violence could be apportioned ‘on many sides’ and claimed that ‘you had some very 
fine people on both sides… the press has treated them [Unite the Right] absolutely unfairly’ 
(Levin, 2017; Gray, 2017). By normalising the events of Charlottesville on a presidential level, 
the divisive impact of the Unite the Right rally was mitigated at a political level in a way that 
the Days of Rage never were; this is a key distinguishing factor between the two events, and 
one that could have ramifications in terms of the future survival of the alt-right movement. In 
essence, the normalisation of alt-right ideology is tied to the electoral success of Trump in 
many ways — it was Trump who was elected in a campaign that bought into alt-right ideas, 
and Trump who assembled a support team in the White House that was made up of a number 
of political theorists and policy-makers affiliated with the alt-right (Glueck, 2016). Even 
recently, over half of the way through his first term, Trump continues to feed into alt-right 
ideology, through both his policy decisions and informal comments, as in August 2019 when 
he retweeted a prominent alt-right conspiracy theory suggesting the Clinton family was 
responsible for murdering disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein (Egan, 2019). Considering the 
case of the Weathermen, the possibility of the alt-right becoming an increasingly established 
part of American political culture is apparent. Despite being self-acknowledged domestic 
terrorists (or, in their own words, a ‘guerrilla vanguard’) throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many 
members of the Weathermen were gradually reintegrated into mainstream society after public 
furore over their actions had waned. Weathermen leaders like Bill Ayers and Bernadine Dohrn 
became preeminent academics, university professors and high-profile lawyers in spite of their 
violent, militant pasts (Swanson, 2001). Given this precedent, and the fact that many alt-right 
figures have already been legitimised in their official appointments by Trump, it is highly 
possible that the alt-right will continue to become further legitimised over time — particularly 
if Trump is endorsed by American voters with a second term as president. 
 
Conclusion 
Since first becoming a part of the socio-political discourse of new social movements in the 
mid-20th Century, the adoption of identity politics has played a dual role in uniting activist 
groups whilst at the same time dividing them from the ideological mainstream. Making the 
shift from traditional Marxist philosophy to the anti-imperialist identity politics that came into 
vogue in the late 1960s marked the beginning of the Weatherman movement. By dismantling 
the traditionalist structures of SDS and re-forming as a radical revolutionary unit, the 
Weathermen were able to construct its own group identity that contributed to its sharp descent 
into revolutionary violence (Burrough, 2015). Radicalisation of its membership both before the 
Days of Rage and after was a key component of the new-found Weather ideology; while this 
program of radicalisation led to the formation of strong connections within the core 
Weatherman membership, it also acted to divide the far-left community and isolate 
Weatherman from its traditional base of supporters and allies. The fact that other violent radical 
groups like the Black Panthers sought to distance themselves from the Weathermen as a result 
of insurgent strategies like the Days of Rage highlights the ways in which the group’s 
unorthodox approach made it less effective in galvanising public support for the revolutionary 
sentiment it intended to ferment (Murphey, 2015).   
 
Lessons can be taken from the rapid rise and fall of the Weathermen, and applied to similarly 
radical groups that trade on identity politics. For the alt-right, the defence of white identity is a 
far more personal prospect than the advancement of black nationalism was for the Weathermen; 
nevertheless, many of the same radicalisation processes used by the Weathermen in a formal 
setting can be observed to be taking place in the online echo chambers frequented by the alt-
right (Nagle, 2017). Self-separating from communities where dissenting views are expressed, 
supporters of the alt-right have constructed their own internal community norms that contribute 
to the perpetuation of a far-right worldview steeped in white nationalism and ethno-centrism 
(Hartzell, 2018). The formation of an alt-right community has led directly to the kind of 
radicalism that bubbled over in the Unite the Right rally: like the Days of Rage, the violence 
demonstrated in Charlottesville represented the transition from intellectual philosophising to a 
more proactive and revolutionary strategy.  
 
It remains to be seen whether Unite the Right will mark the beginning of the end for the alt-
right, as the Days of Rage did for the Weathermen. It is clear, however, that the alt-right has 
been built on the same foundation of identity politics that contributed to the ascendency of the 
Weathermen. More importantly, many of the methods used by the Weathermen have a 
significant amount in common with the processes of radicalisation that is developing in the alt-
right — albeit in a contemporary, technologically-facilitated context. While acknowledging 
these points of comparison is interesting from a historical perspective, it also has the potential 
to inform and guide the ongoing communal approach to the alt-right. The opportunities 
presented by taking a historical perspective are two-fold: not only does understanding the 
methods of the Weatherman movement assist in understanding and preventing similar 
radicalisation in the alt-right, cultivating an appreciation of why the Weatherman movement 
ultimately failed can also provide ideas that could be used to curtail the growth of the alt-right. 
If the contextual distinctions between the socio-political conditions of 1960s and 2010s can be 
accounted for, it is possible for the collapse of the Weatherman organisation to serve as a 
roadmap for policy-makers that highlights both tactics that worked in the past, and those that 
failed. By understanding the processes of radicalisation used by the Weathermen, and what led 
to the organisation’s downfall, it may be possible to combat the alt-right more effectively and 
prevent the ongoing spread of the extremist agenda it promotes.  
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